Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games

Sébastien Courtin and Matias Nuñez

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This work provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the dominance solvability of approval voting games. Our conditions are very simple since they are based on the approval relation, a binary relation between the alternatives. We distinguish between two sorts of dominance solvability and prove that the most stringent one leads to the election of the set of Condorcet Winners whereas this need not be the case for the weak version.

Date: 2013-12-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00914890
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Dominance solvable approval voting games (2017)
Working Paper: Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00914890

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