Property rights with biological spillovers: when Hardin meets Meade

Carlotta Balestra (), Thierry Bréchet and Stéphane Lambrecht
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Carlotta Balestra: CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain

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Abstract: In an overlapping generations (OLG) setup we address the issue of the optimal number of property rights to allocate over a natural resource when the goal is to maximize the stock of the natural resource at the steady state. We assume that the e ect of the enforced property rights regime on the evolution of the resource is twofold: through biological spillovers and through monitoring costs. Property rights are assigned to local communities, which can decide whether to cooperate or not. The outcome in the strategic setting is hence compared to the one in the cooperative setup. A scal policy able to decentralize the cooperative outcome is studied.

Date: 2012
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Working Paper: Property rights with biological spillovers: when Hardin meets Meade (2010)
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