Waiting to imitate: on the dynamic pricing of knowledge

Emeric Henry and Carlos J. Ponce ()
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Carlos J. Ponce: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We study the problem of an inventor who brings to the market an innovation that can be legally copied. Imitators may 'enter' the market by copying the innovation at a cost or by buying from the inventor the knowledge necessary to reproduce and use the invention. The possibility of contracting affects the need for patent protection. Our results reveal that: (i) Imitators wait to enter the market and the inventor becomes a temporary monopolist; (ii) The inventor offers contracts which allow resale of the knowledge acquired by the imitators; (iii) As the pool of potential imitators grows large, the inventor may become a permanent monopolist.

Date: 2009
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01066198
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Related works:
Journal Article: Waiting to Imitate: On the Dynamic Pricing of Knowledge (2011)
Working Paper: Waiting to Imitate: On the Dynamic Pricing of Knowledge (2011)
Working Paper: Waiting to Imitate: On the Dynamic Pricing of Knowledge (2011)
Working Paper: Waiting to imitate: on the dynamic pricing of knowledge (2009)
Working Paper: Waiting to imitate: on the dynamic pricing of knowledge (2009)
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