Efficient extensions of communication values
Sylvain Béal (),
André Casajus and
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André Casajus: Leipzig Graduate School of Management
Frank Huettner: Leipzig Graduate School of Management
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We study values for transferable utility games enriched by a communication graph. The most well-known such values are component-efficient and characterized by some link-deletion property. We study efficient extensions of such values: for a given component-efficient value, we look for a value that (i) satisfies efficiency, (ii) satisfies the link-deletion property underlying the original component-efficient value, and (iii) coincides with the original component-efficient value whenever the underlying graph is connected. Béal et al. (2015) prove that the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) admits a unique efficient extension, which has been introduced by van den Brink et al. (2012). We pursue this line of research by showing that the average tree solution (Herings et al., 2008) and the compensation solution (Béal et al., 2012a) admit similar unique efficient extensions, and that there exists no efficient extension of the position Value (Meessen, 1988; Borm et al., 1992). As byproducts, we obtain new characterizations of the average tree solution and the compensation solution, and of their efficient extensions.
Keywords: component fairness; position value; Efficient extension; average tree solution; compensation solution; relative fairness; balanced total threats; Myerson value; component-wise egalitarian solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Efficient extensions of communication values (2018)
Working Paper: Efficient extensions of communication values (2015)
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