On the Values for Bayesian Cooperative Games with Sidepayments

Andrés Salamanca Lugo ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: In this paper we explore the relationship between several value-like solution concepts for cooperative games with incomplete information and utility transfers in the form of sidepayments. In our model, state-contingent contracts are required to be incentive compatible, and thus utility might not be not fully transferable (as it would be in the complete information case). When we restrict our attention to games with orthogonal coalitions (i.e., which do not involve strategic externalities), our first main result states that Myerson's [Cooperative games with incomplete information. Int. J. Game Theory. (1984), 13, 69-96] generalization of the Shapley NTU value and Salamanca's [A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information. (2016), HAL 01579898] extension of the Harsanyi NTU value are interim utility equivalent. I f we allow for arbitrary informational and strategic externalities, our second main result establishes that the ex-ante evaluation of Myerson's solution equals Kalai and Kalai's [Cooperation in strategic games revisited. Q. J. Econ. (2013) 128, 917-966] cooperative-competitive value in two-player games with verifiable types.

Keywords: Cooperative games; Incomplete information; Sidepayments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-02-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01468867v3
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-01468867v3/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments (2020)
Working Paper: On the Values of Bayesian Cooperative Games with Sidepayments (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01468867

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().