EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Spatial resource wars: A two region example

Giorgio Fabbri (), Silvia Faggian () and Giuseppe Freni ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We develop a spatial resource model in continuous time in which two agents strategically exploit a mobile resource in a two-locations setup. In order to contrast the overexploitation of the resource (the tragedy of commons) that occurs when the player are free to choose where to fish/hunt/extract/harvest, the regulator can establish a series of spatially structured policies. We compare the three situations in which the regulator: (a) leaves the player free to choose where to harvest; (b) establishes a natural reserve where nobody is allowed to harvest; (c) assigns to each player a specific exclusive location to hunt. We show that when preference parameters dictate a low harvesting intensity, the policies cannot mitigate the overexploitation and in addition they worsen the utilities of the players. Conversely, in a context of harsher harvesting intensity, the intervention can help to safeguard the resource, preventing the extinction and also improving the welfare of both players.

Keywords: Spatial harvesting problems; Markov perfect equilibrium; Environmental protec-; tion policies; Differential Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-gth
Date: 2018-04
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01762471
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01762471/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Spatial resource wars: A two region example (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Spatial resource wars: A two region example (2018) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01762471

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

 
Page updated 2019-06-24
Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01762471