Obfuscation and Honesty Experimental Evidence on Insurance Demand with Multiple Distribution Channels

Claire Mouminoux (), Jean-Louis Rullière () and Stéphane Loisel
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Claire Mouminoux: LSAF - Laboratoire de Sciences Actuarielle et Financière - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon
Jean-Louis Rullière: LSAF - Laboratoire de Sciences Actuarielle et Financière - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon

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Abstract: This paper aims to shed light on the dilemma faced by insurance purchasers faced with multiple distribution channels. Should the consumer herself choose from a large set of insurance policies or rather delegate a part her decision to an intermediary who is more or less honest? We consider decisions based on a number of real-world insurance distribution channels with different information frames. Beliefs about intermediary honesty are the main determinants of individual choice. In addition, the obfuscation of information is the main source of inefficiency in decision-making, particularly regarding the characteristics of the insurance contracts chosen by consumers.

Keywords: behavioral economics; distribution channels; honesty; insurance; intermediation; obfuscation; search costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-06-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01819522v1
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01819522

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