Merger Control on Two-Sided Markets: Is There Need for an Efficiency Defense?
Edmond Baranes (),
Thomas Cortade and
Andreea Cosnita-Langlais
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Edmond Baranes: MRE - Montpellier Recherche en Economie - UM - Université de Montpellier
Working Papers from HAL
Abstract:
We study horizontal mergers on two-sided markets between horizontally differentiated platforms. We provide a theoretical analysis of the merger's price effect based on the amount of cost savings it generates, the behavior of outsider platforms, and the size of cross-group network effects. We point out differences as compared with the standard, one-sided merger analysis, and also discuss the merger control policy implications.
Keywords: horizontal merger; merger control; cost savings; two-sided markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Merger control on two- sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense? (2017)
Working Paper: Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense? (2016)
Working Paper: Merger control on two- sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense? (2015)
Working Paper: Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense? (2015)
Working Paper: Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense? (2015)
Working Paper: Merger control on two- sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense? (2015)
Working Paper: Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense? (2014)
Working Paper: Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense? (2014) 
Working Paper: Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficinecy defense? (2014) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01830016
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2506359
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