Debt in Political Campaigns

Alexei Ovtchinnikov and Philip Valta

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Debt is a significant source of funding of political campaigns, with almost half of all campaigns relying on some form of debt. We analyze the incentives created by this type of debt financing. We show that indebted politicians raise more funds in subsequent elections, especially from special interest groups. Consistent with votes-for-money arrangements, indebted politicians vote for the benefit of those interest groups that help funding their reelection campaigns. The findings support the hypothesis that debt creates distortions, as it forces indebted politicians to take policy positions that are not aligned with the local constituents' interests.

Keywords: Debt financing; Political campaigns; Voting behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-07-05
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Working Paper: Debt in Political Campaigns (2018)
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