Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games
Stefano Lovo and
Tristan Tomala
Working Papers from HAL
Abstract:
We introduce the model of Stochastic Revision Games where a finite set of players control a state variable and receive payoffs as a function of the state at a terminal deadline. There is a Poisson clock which dictates when players are called to choose of revise their actions. This paper studies the existence of Markov perfect equilibria in those games. We give an existence proof assuming some form of correlation.
Date: 2015-06-24
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Working Paper: Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games (2015) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02002783
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