Collecting and Selling Consumer Information: Selling Mechanisms Matter
David Bounie (),
Antoine Dubus () and
Patrick Waelbroeck
Additional contact information
David Bounie: IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, SES - Département Sciences Economiques et Sociales - Télécom Paris - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, ECOGE - Economie Gestion - I3 SES - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation de Telecom Paris - Télécom Paris - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Antoine Dubus: D-MTEC - Department of Management, Technology, and Economics [ETH Zürich] - ETH Zürich - Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology [Zürich]
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Abstract:
We study the strategies of a data intermediary collecting and selling information to competing firms under different selling mechanisms. We characterize the amount of data collected and sold as well as the price of information with posted prices, sequential bargaining, first-price and second-price auctions. We generalize pair-wise comparisons to establish the economic properties of classes of mechanisms.
Date: 2022-11-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-big, nep-com, nep-mic and nep-pay
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02288708
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