The impact of benefit sanctions on equilibrium wage dispersion and job vacancies
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Usually, the literature on benefit sanctions focuses on the effects on labour supply. In this paper, we integrate commuting costs in an equilibrium job search model with wages posting to analyse the effects of job search monitoring on labour demand. We show that benefit sanctions increase job creation, but degrade the job quality and the average job-productivity. In addition, we emphasise that the optimal UB system is characterised by using both benefit sanctions and the mutualisation of commuting costs.
Keywords: Wage dispersion; Job search; sanctions; Monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: The impact of benefit sanctions on equilibrium wage dispersion and job vacancies (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02441229
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