A matching model of the market for migrant smuggling services

Claire Naiditch and Radu Vranceanu

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: The important flows of irregular migration could not exist without the emergence of a criminal market for smuggling services. A matching model à la Pissarides (2000) provides a well-suited framework to analyze such a flow market with significant trade frictions. Our analysis considers the competitive segment of this underground market in which small-business smugglers can freely enter. The model allows us to determine the equilibrium number of smugglers, the matching probability, the number of successful irregular migrants and, as an original concept, the equilibrium migrant welfare. Changes in parameters can be related to the various policies implemented by destination countries to cut down irregular migration.

Keywords: Matching model; Migrant welfare; Smuggling; Irregular migration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-int and nep-mig
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://essec.hal.science/hal-02463193
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: A matching model of the market for migrant smuggling services (2020)
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