Digital Privacy

Itay Fainmesser (), Andrea Galeotti and Ruslan Momot
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Ruslan Momot: HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales

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Abstract: We study the incentives of a digital business to collect and protect users' information. The information the business collects improves the service it provides to consumers, but it may also be accessed, at a cost, by third strategic parties in a way that harms users, imposing privacy costs. We characterize how the revenue model of the business shapes the equilibrium data policy. We compare the equilibrium data policy with the social optimum and show that a two-pronged policy, which combines a minimal data protection requirement with a tax proportional to the amount of data collected, restores efficiency.

Keywords: Information security; online platforms; data-driven businesses; data policy design; advertisement-driven businesses; transaction-driven businesses; welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Digital Privacy (2023)
Working Paper: Digital Privacy (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02896509

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3459274

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