FinTech in the Financial Market
Maxime Delabarre ()
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Maxime Delabarre: Sciences Po - Sciences Po
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This essay argues that the common competition framework is not to be applied to the financial sector. If traditionally competition brings efficiency and diversity in a market, financial regulators must also ensure the stability of the financial market. Henceforth, some limits and entry barriers have to exist. This is particularly true for FinTech companies. If the potential of those new actors is not to be contested, the risk they can bring is also quite obvious. If regulators want the market to be disrupted and to see consumers benefiting from the power of innovation of technology-based companies, they need to adapt their regulatory framework. Only under this condition will the benefits outweigh the potential risks.
Keywords: Financial regulations; financial stability; competition; financial market; innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cwa, nep-fdg, nep-fmk and nep-pay
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03107769
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