Asymmetric punishment, Leniency and Harassment Bribes in China: a selective survey
Jun Hu ()
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Jun Hu: UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas
Working Papers from HAL
Following the Basu's proposal in 2011 of legalizing the bribe giving, enormous theorical and experimental work appears afterwards in studying the effectiveness of the asymmetric punishments and leniency on anti-corruption in developing countries like China. This paper tries to have an objective and just survey of the relative important researches on this subject, aiming to approach an agreement on the conclusion and to provide some enlightenments for further studies.
Keywords: China; Whistle-blowing; Leniency; Asymmetric Penalties; Corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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