Equal division among the few: an experiment about a coalition formation game

Yukihiko Funaki, Emmanuel Sol and Marc Willinger
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Yukihiko Funaki: Waseda University [Tokyo, Japan]
Emmanuel Sol: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement

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Abstract: We study experimentally a three player sequential and symmetric coalition formation game with empty core. In each round a randomly chosen proposer must choose between a two players coalition or a three players coalition and decide about the payoff division among the coalition members. Players who receive a proposition can accept or reject it. In case of acceptance the game ends. If it is rejected, a new proposer is randomly selected. The game was played repeatedly, with randomly rematched groups. We observe that over 86% of the realized coalitions are two-players coalitions. Three players coalitions are often observed in early rounds but are frequently rejected. Equal splits are the most frequently observed divisions among coalition members, and their frequency increases sharply over time. We propose an extension of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)'s notion of stable set to account for our results.

Date: 2021-05-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Working Paper: Equal division among the few: an experiment about a coalition formation game (2021)
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