Politics, Institutions and Tax Revenue Mobilization in West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) Countries
Yawovi Mawussé Isaac Amedanou ()
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Yawovi Mawussé Isaac Amedanou: CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne
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This paper argues that the main determinant of differences in tax revenue collection across countries are differences in political regimes and institutions. The evidence based on the 8 members States of West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) over the period 90-2017, clearly supports that tax collection leads to better economic institutions and more democratic political system. Thus, handle the problem of tax collection will entail a reform of these institutions and a democratization of the political regimes. Institutions, political regimes, and democracy significantly increase tax collection while autocracy reduces it. The findings turn out to be robust accounting for the potential endogeneity of various institutions and aid intensity through 2SLS estimates.
Keywords: Political regime; Democracy; Autocracy; Institutions; Tax revenue; WAEMU (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03255316
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