Loss Aversion and Conspicuous Consumption in Networks
Yann Bramoullé () and
Christian Ghiglino ()
Working Papers from HAL
We introduce loss aversion into a model of conspicuous consumption in networks. Agents allocate their income between a standard good and a status good to maximize a Cobb-Douglas utility. Agents interact over a connected network and compare their status consumption to their neighbors' average consumption. Loss aversion has a profound impact. If loss aversion is large enough relative to income heterogeneity, a continuum of Nash equilibria appears and all agents consume the same quantity of status good. Otherwise, there is a unique Nash equilibrium and richest agents earn strict status gains while poorest agents earn strict status losses.
Keywords: Loss Aversion; Conspicuous Consumption; Social Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-upt
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Working Paper: Loss Aversion and Conspicuous Consumption in Networks (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03630455
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