Information Design with Agency

Jacopo Bizzotto, Eduardo Perez and Adrien Vigier ()
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Adrien Vigier: BI Norwegian Business School [Oslo]

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Abstract: We consider a general information design problem in which the task of running a procedure generating information for a continuation game is performed by an agent. A moral hazard problem therefore emerges in which the principal faces a trade-off between generating information that is persuasive in the continuation game, and efficiently incentivizing the agent to comply with the procedure designed. Standard concavification techniques do not apply in this environment. We provide a general methodology to tackle such problems, and examine the way in which moral hazard affects the optimal procedure of the principal.

Keywords: Information Design; Moral Hazard; Agency Cost; Information Acquisition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03874017
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Related works:
Working Paper: Information Design with Agency (2020)
Working Paper: Information Design with Agency (2019)
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