Market making by an FX dealer: tiers, pricing ladders and hedging rates for optimal risk control

Alexander Barzykin, Philippe Bergault () and Olivier Guéant
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Philippe Bergault: CMAP - Centre de Mathématiques Appliquées de l'Ecole polytechnique - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Dealers make money by providing liquidity to clients but face flow uncertainty and thus price risk. They can efficiently skew their prices and wait for clients to mitigate risk (internalization), or trade with other dealers in the open market to hedge their position and reduce their inventory (externalization). Of course, the better control associated with externalization comes with transaction costs and market impact. The internalization vs. externalization dilemma has been a topic of recent active discussion within the foreign exchange (FX) community. This paper offers an optimal control framework for market making tackling both pricing and hedging, thus answering a question well known to dealers: `to hedge, or not to hedge?'

Date: 2022-12-05
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Working Paper: Market making by an FX dealer: tiers, pricing ladders and hedging rates for optimal risk control (2022)
Working Paper: Market making by an FX dealer: tiers, pricing ladders and hedging rates for optimal risk control (2022)
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