Why environmental regulation may lead to no-regret pollution abatement?

Thierry Bréchet and Pierre-André Jouvet

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Empirical evidence support the existence of pollution abatement possibilities at negative costs, the so-called 'no-regret options'. We provide a microeconomic rationale for the existence of such potential at the firm's level under environmental regulation. An econometric application confirms that marginal pollution abatement cost curves with no-regret options are compatible with a standard production function, as stated in our theoretical model.

Keywords: No-regret options; pollution; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Working Paper: Why environmental regulation may lead to no-regret pollution abatement? (2006)
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