On the allocation of talented people in developing countries: the role of oil rents

Christian Ebeke, Luc Omgba and Rachid Laajaj

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Evidence has shown that the allocation of talented people affects the long-term growth. It has been found that a large population of engineers tends to foster innovation and growth more rapidly than population of lawyers and other activities with access to the public rent. Yet little is known about what determines the allocation of talents. This paper uses a sample of 69 developing countries to address this question. It shows that the oil rent tends to orient talents towards productive activities in well-governed countries, and towards rentseeking activities in poorly governed countries. These results are robust to different specifications, datasets on governance quality and estimation methods. The paper sheds light on the sources and mechanisms of the resource curse through its effect on human resources and rent-seeking activities.

Keywords: Rent-seeking; occupational choice; oil rents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04141068
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-04141068/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: On the allocation of talented people in developing countries: the role of oil rents (2012)
Working Paper: On the allocation of talented people in developing countries: the role of oil rents (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04141068

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().