Do Sanctions or Moral Costs Prevent the Formation of Cartel-Type Agreements?

Béatrice Boulu-Reshef and Constance Monnier-Schlumberger ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Remplace une version précédente du même numéro / Replaces a previous version of the same DR LEO number Cette version remplace celle du / This replaces the previous version dated : XX/XX/XXXX Titre précédent / A previous version was titled : "Remplacer par l'ancien titre" A paraitre dans / Forthcoming in : Nom du journal, vol, numéro, pages Paru dans /

Date: 2023-07-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04153693

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.8119416

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