Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais and Jean-Philippe Tropeano

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of commitment decisions on the efficiency of antitrust enforcement. We discuss the optimal use of commitments considering past rulings as a source of knowledge to better assess future similar antitrust cases. Our framework combines two key effects: the deterrence of the anticompetitive behavior by the different enforcement regimes, and the dynamic perspective through litigation as a source of learning. We show that if the level of penalty is high enough, the antitrust authorities undervalue the dynamic informational benefit of litigation and tend to over-use commitments.

Keywords: antitrust; commitments; deterrence; legal learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04159724
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Related works:
Journal Article: Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments (2022)
Working Paper: Learning by Litigation:An Application to Antitrust Commitments (2022)
Working Paper: Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments (2022)
Working Paper: Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments (2022)
Working Paper: Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments (2021)
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