Payments for environmental services with ecological thresholds: farmers' preferences for a sponsorship bonus

Paiements pour services environnementaux en présence de seuils écologiques: préférences des agriculteurs pour un bonus de parrainage

Fanny Le Gloux (), Carole Ropars-Collet (), Alice Issanchou and Pierre Dupraz
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Fanny Le Gloux: SMART - Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement
Carole Ropars-Collet: SMART - Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement
Alice Issanchou: SMART - Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement

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Abstract: Designing incentives for agri-environmental public good provision with threshold effects calls for payment mechanisms favouring critical mass participation and continuity of commitments at the landscape scale. Studies show farmers are reluctant to collective requirements but favourable to a bonus rewarding collective action. We conducted a choice experiment to test the acceptability of a bonus in a hypothetical scheme for improving rivers' water quality in France. We introduce a sponsorship bonus each time the farmer convinces a peer into entering the scheme that can be combined with a collective result bonus per hectare if the river reaches a higher step of the water quality scale. We consider the involvement of local financers could increase the willingness to pay beyond opportunity costs and income foregone, and propose higher levels of payment than agri-environmental schemes. Results suggests a sponsorship bonus on its own is cost-effective, and that preferences for the bonus levels are heterogeneous..

Keywords: Water quality; Choice experiment; Collective action; Mixed logit model; Latent class model; Qualité de l’eau; Expérience de choix; Action collective; Modèle logit mixte; Modèle à classes latentes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-07-18
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-04164749v1
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Related works:
Working Paper: Payments for environmental services with ecological thresholds: farmers’ preferences for a sponsorship bonus (2024)
Working Paper: Payments for environmental services with ecological thresholds: farmers’ preferences for a sponsorship bonus (2023)
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