A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring

Johannes Hörner and Jérôme Renault
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Johannes Hörner: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We adapt the methods from Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) to finitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. Under a combination of (a slight strengthening of) the assumptions of Benoît and Krishna (1985) and those of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), a folk theorem follows. Three counterexamples show that our assumptions are tight.

Keywords: Repeated; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-09-27
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