Conciliation, Social Preferences, and Pre-Trial Settlement: a Laboratory Experiment

Matthieu Belarouci (), Vincent Lenglin () and Rémi Suchon
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Matthieu Belarouci: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Vincent Lenglin: ANTHROPO LAB - Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Expérimentale - ETHICS EA 7446 - Experience ; Technology & Human Interactions ; Care & Society : - ICL - Institut Catholique de Lille - UCL - Université catholique de Lille, ETHICS EA 7446 - Experience ; Technology & Human Interactions ; Care & Society : - ICL - Institut Catholique de Lille - UCL - Université catholique de Lille

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Abstract: We experimentally study conciliation, an intervention aimed at improving bargaining efficiency. In conciliation, a neutral third party collaborates with the parties by suggesting resolutions to promote agreements. Unlike delegation or arbitration, conciliation fully preserves the autonomy of the parties. Unlike mediation, the conciliator cannot filter information. Whether conciliation can improve bargaining efficiency is an open question. In our laboratory experiment, two "litigants" bargain over the split of a loss in an unstructured protocol. In case of failure, a random split is implemented. In some conditions, a third party, the conciliator takes part in the bargaining by submitting non-binding suggestions to the litigants. We find that, on average, conciliation does not affect the likelihood of failure or the splits that are agreed upon by litigants. However, for bargaining pairs composed of selfish litigants, conciliation leads to more equal agreements. Conciliation also reduces bargaining delays: the time and the number of offers necessary to converge to an agreement are significantly reduced in the presence of a conciliator.

Keywords: Bargaining game; Bargaining process; Conciliation; Social preferences; Experiment; Pre-trial settlement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11-06
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