Rituals of Reason: Experimental Evidence on the Social Acceptability of Lotteries in Allocation Problems

Elias Bouacida () and Renaud Foucart
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Elias Bouacida: UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis, LED - Laboratoire d'Economie Dionysien - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis

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Abstract: We study collective preferences towards the use of random procedures in allocation mechanisms. We report the results of two experiments in which subjects choose a procedure to allocate a reward to half of them. The first possibility is an explicitly random device: the result of a lottery. The second is an equally unpredictable procedure with identical rate of success, but not involving any explicit randomization. We identify an aversion to lotteries, in particular against procedures that are reminiscent of meritocratic ones. In line with the literature, we also find evidence of a preference for control in most procedures.

Keywords: Lotteries; Mechanism design; Allocation problems; Procedures; Tie-breaking rule; Social choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-10-10
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