Contract Terms Monotonicity in Matching Markets

Cyril Rouault

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We investigate the impact of adding contract terms on stable allocations in the doctor-hospital matching market. Surprisingly, expanding term options can decrease doctors' welfare at the doctor-optimal stable allocation, even if the added terms are utilized. Our results show that withdrawing unused terms can lead to a Pareto improvement for doctors. We demonstrate the robustness of our results and examine their implementation within two preference domains commonly present in many markets: lexicographic and aligned preferences.

Keywords: Matching with contracts; Preferences domains; Stability; Welfare; Adding terms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-12-15
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