Sharing Losses in Dictator and Ultimatum Games: A Meta-Analysis

Francois Cochard () and Alexandre Flage ()
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Francois Cochard: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]
Alexandre Flage: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: Are people less socially oriented when sharing losses instead of gains? This paper reports the findings of a meta-analysis of 33 studies with 114 estimates from ultimatum and dictator games in which participants share losses (of money, time, or even physical well-being) instead of gains. We provide evidence that dictators leave significantly more to receivers when sharing losses. Proposers are also fairer when sharing losses, but the result is only significant when protocol biases are controlled for. Receivers, on the other hand, demand significantly more in the loss-sharing ultimatum game than in the gain-sharing game. They also demand significantly more when the strategy method is employed. Moreover, we found that non-students are more generous and fairer when sharing losses than students. Finally, we found that, whether sharing a loss of time, a loss of money, or physical pain, players' behaviors do not differ in terms of the percentage of loss shared or demanded.

Keywords: Dictator game; Ultimatum Game; Loss-Sharing; Meta-analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-01-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://univ-fcomte.hal.science/hal-04390038v1
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