Equilibrium bids for reverse auctions when the budget is announced - Some preliminary results

Équilibres pour les enchères inversées quand le budget est annoncé – Quelques résultats préliminaires

Alain Jean-Marie () and Mabel Tidball ()
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Alain Jean-Marie: NEO - Network Engineering and Operations - CRISAM - Centre Inria d'Université Côte d'Azur - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique
Mabel Tidball: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier

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Abstract: We consider a budget-constrained reverse auction: offers are accepted until some predefined budget is exhausted. Payments are discriminatory: bidders receive their own bid as payment when they win the bid. Bidders have a private value for their item which is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1; they are risk-neutral and items are indivisible. For small budget and an arbitrary number of bidders, as well as in the case of two bidders, we find an equilibrium bidding function. When possible, we compare with the equilibrium bidding function of target-constrained reverse auctions.

Keywords: budget-constrained reverse auctions; equilibrium bidding function; target-constrained reverse auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-03
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://inria.hal.science/hal-04520388v1
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Published in RR-9545, Inria; CEE-M. Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier. 2024, pp.19

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