Mediated communication with coarse messages

Mael Le Treust () and Tristan Tomala ()
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Mael Le Treust: IRISA - Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires - UR - Université de Rennes - INSA Rennes - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Rennes - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - ENS Rennes - École normale supérieure - Rennes - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - CentraleSupélec - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris]
Tristan Tomala: HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales

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Abstract: In this paper, we consider sender-receiver problems where the two parties communicate via a coarse set of messages. We propose a concept of mediated communication equilibrium capturing the message limitations. Mediation always weakly increases the set of equilibrium outcomes. We give conditions under which mediation can be dispensed with, or to the contrary, strictly improves welfare maximisation over equilibrium outcomes.

Keywords: Mediated communication; Mechanism design; Bayesian persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-08-03
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