Insurance Microeconomics: Problems and Solutions

Pierre Picard

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper brings together problems in insurance microeconomics that can be used in an intermediate level course. It starts with insurance demand and optimal insurance contracts, including coinsurance, straight deductible contracts and umbrella policy. The effects of a background risk and moral hazard on optimal insurance coverage are the subject of specific problems. Ex post moral hazard in health insurance, self-insurance and parametric insurance are also analyzed. Detailed solutions are provided.

Keywords: insurance; microeconomics; risk aversion; contract; deductible; coinsurance; parametric insurance; health insurance; self-insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-02-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04946089v1
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