Platform Competition and Innovation

Doh-Shin Jeon and Patrick Rey
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Patrick Rey: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: We study the development of apps on competing platforms. We show that competition leads to commissions exceeding those maximizing consumer surplus (and, a fortiori, social welfare) whenever raising one commission reduces rivals' app bases. We relate this nding to economies of scope in app development and, to illustrate it, consider a setting in which some developers can port their apps at no cost: as their proportion increases, app development is progressively choked-o. Fostering platform competition or interoperability may therefore fail to produce the desired results. Within-platform app store competition, together with appropriate access conditions, may constitute a more promising avenue.

Keywords: app development; app stores; ad-valorem commissions; Platform competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02-19
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04956965v2
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Working Paper: Platform Competition and Innovation (2026)
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