Associated consistency and the egalitarian value

Florian Navarro ()
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Florian Navarro: GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement

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Abstract: We propose a new associated game built around the marginal contributions of players to the complementary coalition. We use this associated game in an associated consistency axiom. We identify the subset of efficient, symmetric and linear sharing rules that satisfy this associated consistency and show that, amongst these, only the egalitarian value is monotonic.

Keywords: cooperative games; egalitarian value; associated consistency; consistency; linear values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-02-24
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04964303v1
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