Matching Models and Optimal registry for voluntary Organ Donation registries

Frédérique Fève and Jean-Pierre Florens
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Frédérique Fève: GREMAQ - Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LEASP - Epidémiologie et Analyses en Santé Publique : risques, maladies chroniques et handicap - INSERM - Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale
Jean-Pierre Florens: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: This paper considers a general decision model of voluntary organ donation registry. The main example is given by the marrow donors registries organized in most of the major countries. A registry is a list of voluntary donors with known type and transplantation requires identical type between donor and receiver. As typing has a relative high cost registry should be organized in an optimal way in order to increase the probability for a patient to find a donor. This paper shows what is the optimal (but not implementable) registry and how filtering mechanism may be used in order to improve actual registry.

Keywords: Decision theory; Evaluation of information system; Marrow donors registry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-06-05
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