Informed communication equilibrium

Frederic Koessler and Vasiliki Skreta ()
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Vasiliki Skreta: UCL - University College London [UCL]

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Abstract: We consider a privately informed principal selecting a communication device to influence players' actions. In contrast to standard information design, the principal cannot commit ex-ante, and the device must elicit information from all players. We define an informed communication equilibrium (ICE) as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of this informed communication design game. We show that the set of ICE is the subset of communication equilibria (CE) that yield principal payoff vectors bounded below by an equilibrium payoff vector of the silent game, under some consistent interim beliefs. The ex-ante optimal CE may fail to be an ICE. We provide sufficient conditions for a CE to be an ICE and identify classes of games in which CE and ICE coincide.

Keywords: communication equilibrium; informed principal; correlated equilibrium; mediation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02-20
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