Informed communication equilibrium

Frédéric Koessler () and Vasiliki Skreta ()
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Frédéric Koessler: GREGHEC - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Vasiliki Skreta: UCL - University College of London [London], UT Austin Texas, US.

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Abstract: We consider a privately informed sender selecting a mediated communication device to influence players' actions. In contrast to standard information design, there is no ex-ante commitment, and the communication device relies on information elicited from the informed parties. We define an informed communication equilibrium (ICE) as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the informed mediated communication game. We show that the set of ICE is the subset of communication equilibria (CE) that yield sender payoff vectors bounded below by an equilibrium payoff vector of the silent game, under some consistent interim beliefs. The principal's ex-ante optimal CE may not be an ICE. In sender-receiver games, the set of CE payoff vectors lies in the convex hull of the set of payoff vectors above silence. Hence, if the latter set is convex, as is the case when the sender has transparent motives, the sets of CE and ICE coincide.

Keywords: communication equilibrium; informed principal; correlated equilibrium; mediation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-06-20
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