Inter-group relocation policies

Nicolas Querou

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We analyze the distributional and welfare effects of an inter-group relocation policy in settings featuring strategic spillovers and externalities within and between groups of agents. Conclusions depend on whether in-group interactions feature strategic substitutes or complements, and on whether strategic complements are weak or strong. When groups differ in size, there are welfare gains but the policy is not Pareto improving. When in- and out-group strategic spillovers differ in magnitude, Pareto improving cases exist, and are fully characterized, under in-group strategic substitutes and strong complements. The policy has also a positive welfare effect under weak strategic complements. This case requires a higher degree of heterogeneity in fundamentals for the policy to be Pareto improving.

Keywords: Externalities; spillover effects; strategic interactions; inter-group relocation policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-05125710v2
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-05125710v2/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Inter-group relocation policies (2025)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05125710

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().