 Une analyse économique du marché des plateformes juridiques en ligneYannick Gabuthy (),
Mehdi Ayouni (),
Cécile Bourreau-Dubois (),
Bruno Deffains (),
Myriam Doriat-Duban (),
Tim Friehe (),
Thierry Lambert () and
Thomas Lanzi ()
Working Papers from HAL Abstract: The current digital revolution, driven by algorithms, artificial intelligence and the processing of massive data, is transforming the world of justice, particularly through the appearance of platforms offering online legal services. Due to the technological innovation on which they are based, these legaltechs contribute to fundamentally renewing the offer of legal services for litigants. This report aims to draw up an inventory of the contributions, limits and risk factors associated with this renewal of practices, this inventory being based on several theoretical analyses mobilizing the standard tools and fields of microeconomics (i.e. public economics, industrial economics and game theory). The first part of this report seeks to identify the activities of these new players in the legal sphere, the structure of the market in which they operate and the way in which this structure is modified by their intervention. From a normative point of view, this involves examining to what extent the provision of a public service, that of justice, by private entities, legal platforms, can involve necessary regulation by the State. The need for public intervention is not only linked to ethical or regulatory considerations but follows purely economic concerns, which are based on the nature of the market in question (characterized in particular by the presence of network externalities and the fact that justice is not a private good). Among these concerns, the justice market is naturally characterized by the existence of information asymmetries, between providers of legal services (lawyers, notaries, etc.) and applicants for such services (litigants), asymmetries which alter market efficiency. A legal service thus has the properties of a confidence good which can be the source of opportunistic behaviour on the supply side to the detriment of demand. In this regard, as we analyse in the second part, the advent of online legal platforms, as providers of market information, can constitute a source of efficiency (in particular by promoting access to law). Certain conditions, relating to the organisation of the market, the way in which information is communicated to litigants and the pricing system adopted by the platforms in question, must however be satisfied and are analysed in this part. In the third and final part of the report, we study legal platforms as extrajudicial dispute resolution mechanisms. The analysis focuses more specifically on the case of "Kleros", a decentralized justice platform using blockchain technology. Disputes are recorded there in the form of "smart contracts", supposed to allow automation of justice, and the process is based on the use of jurors paid in cryptocurrency, whose incentives to make an impartial decision are based on the precepts of game theory. The analysis of this type of dispute resolution procedure nevertheless shows that certain concerns exist, of a technical, legal and behavioural nature. The impartiality of decisions is particularly questionable given the incentives and interactions at work. Keywords: Accès à la justice; Information; Plateformes juridiques; Régulation; Résolution des litiges (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in 20.01, IERDJ - Institut des Études et de la Recherche sur le Droit et la Justice. 2023, 112 p Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05155208 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Working Papers from HAL |
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