On Taxation Policy in Strategic Bilateral Exchange: A review

Gagnie Pascal Yebarth ()
Additional contact information
Gagnie Pascal Yebarth: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper provides a comprehensive review of the literature on tax policy within the framework of strategic market games (SMG). We refer to a simple prototype of SMGs called bilateral oligopoly models. The review reveals that the effects and effectiveness of redistributive tax policies depend on the preferences of individuals who behave strategically in trade. A crucial element of this analysis is the influence of strategic interactions on the price formation mechanism and, therefore, on the optimality of a tax-and-transfer policy to improve allocation efficiency. Then, we connect our findings to broader discussions in the literature, specifically regarding the effects of taxation on general and partial equilibrium (tax incidence: ad valorem versus per unit taxes; optimal taxation and market power; market imperfections, strategic interactions, and taxation). Although the comparison remains conceptually complicated, we show the complementarity of the diverse literature.

Keywords: Imperfect competition; Market power; Strategic market game; Tax policy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05158124v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-05158124v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05158124

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().