Governance, productivity and economic development

Cuong Le Van (), Ngoc-Sang Pham (), Thi Kim Cuong Pham () and Binh Tran-Nam
Additional contact information
Cuong Le Van: IPAG Business School
Ngoc-Sang Pham: Métis Lab EM Normandie - EM Normandie - École de Management de Normandie = EM Normandie Business School
Thi Kim Cuong Pham: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Binh Tran-Nam: UNSW Business School - UNSW - University of New South Wales [Sydney]

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Abstract: This paper explores the interplay between transfer policies, R&D, corruption, and economic development using a general equilibrium model with hetero-generous agents and a government. The government collects taxes, redistributes fiscal revenues, and undertakes public investment (in R&D, infrastructure, etc.). Corruption is modeled as a fraction of tax revenues that is siphoned off and removed from the economy. We first establish the existence of a political-economic equilibrium. Then, using an analytically tractable framework with two private agents, we examine the effects of corruption and evaluate the impact of various policies, including redistribution and innovation-led strategies.

Keywords: Corruption; governance; economic development; productivity; general equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-07-06
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