Sequential College Admission Mechanisms and Off-Platform Options

Olivier de Groote, Anaïs Fabre, Margaux Luflade and Arnaud Maurel
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Olivier de Groote: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Anaïs Fabre: IFS - Laboratory of the Institute for Fiscal Studies - Institute for Fiscal Studies
Margaux Luflade: University of Pennsylvania

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Abstract: The optimal functioning of centralized allocation systems is undermined by the pres-ence of institutions operating off-platform—a feature common to virtually all real-world implementations. These off-platform options generate justified envy, as students may reject their centralized assignment in favor of an outside offer, leaving vacant seats in programs that others would have preferred to their current match. We examine whether sequential assignment procedures can mitigate this inefficiency: they allow students to delay their enrollment decision to potentially receive a better offer later, at the cost of waiting before knowing their final admission outcome. To quantify this trade-off, we estimate a dynamic model of application and acceptance decisions using rich adminis-trative data from the French college admission system, which include rank-ordered lists and waiting decisions. We find that waiting costs are large. Yet, by improving students' assignment outcomes relative to a standard single-round system, the sequential mecha-nism decreases the share of students who leave the higher education system without a degree by 5.4% and leads to large welfare gains.

Date: 2025-08-18
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Working Paper: Sequential College Admission Mechanisms and Off-Platform Options (2025)
Working Paper: Sequential College Admission Mechanisms and Off-Platform Options (2025)
Working Paper: Sequential College Admission Mechanisms and Off-Platform Options (2025)
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