Buyer Power and Product Selection in Interlocking Relationships

Pouvoir d'achat et sélection de produits dans les relations interdépendantes

Claire Chambolle (), Clémence Christin () and Hugo Molina ()
Additional contact information
Claire Chambolle: UMR PSAE - Paris-Saclay Applied Economics - AgroParisTech - Université Paris-Saclay - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Clémence Christin: IDEES - Identité et Différenciation de l’Espace, de l’Environnement et des Sociétés - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - ULH - Université Le Havre Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - IRIHS - Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire Homme et Société - UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université
Hugo Molina: UMR PSAE - Paris-Saclay Applied Economics - AgroParisTech - Université Paris-Saclay - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We develop a model of interlocking vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers, where retailers select which product(s) to distribute. We highlight that an incomplete buyer-seller network may arise for two reasons. When retail substitution and buyer power are high, retailers have incentives to differentiate their product assortments to soften downstream competition. When instead retail substitution and buyer power are low, at least one retailer has an incentive to restrict its assortment to extract rents from manufacturers. We use our framework to provide new insights for competition policy, focusing on horizontal mergers and slotting fee practices.

Keywords: Endogenous product assortment; Vertical relations; Buyer power; Slotting fees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-08-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-05213591v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-05213591v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05213591

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().