Measuring beliefs and ambiguity attitudes in a public good game: an experimental study

Nahed Eddai ()
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Nahed Eddai: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: Ambiguity attitudes, which capture how behavior differs under risky situations (known probabilities) versus uncertain situations (unknown probabilities), are well established in behavioral economics. While widely studied in theoretical settings, their role in social dilemmas such as public good provision remains underexplored. In particular, little empirical attention has been paid to how perceived ambiguity about others' contributions shapes individual behavior in public good games. This study addresses that gap by examining the relationship between ambiguity attitudes and contribution decisions in a strategic setting. Our results indicate that notwithstanding the normative arguments for higher levels of cooperation under ambiguity aversion, individuals with more pessimistic expectations about their group members' contributions tend to contribute less themselves.

Keywords: Belief measurement; Ambiguity; Public good game; Ellsberg urn (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08-19
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-05214341v1
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