The Economics of Coercion: Kolm's Liberal Social Contract and Public Goods

Kevin Leportier ()
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Kevin Leportier: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, INSPÉ Normandie Caen - Institut national supérieur du professorat et de l'éducation - Normandie Caen - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université

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Abstract: Providing public goods is often viewed as a core function of the state, since the private sector would necessarily fail to do so efficiently: this is what is known as the public good argument. One may object to this argument either by claiming, as libertarians do, that state coercion is not in fact necessary, or by arguing that its necessity does not make it acceptable. By exploring and discussing the somewhat overlooked theory of the liberal social contract developed by Serge-Christophe Kolm, this article shows how the public good argument can be reformulated to address these objections.

Date: 2025-08-26
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