Membership Turnover and Policy Disagreement at the FOMC

Alessandro Riboni and Francisco Ruge-Murcia ()
Additional contact information
Francisco Ruge-Murcia: McGill University = Université McGill [Montréal, Canada]

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper examines the implications of turnover for decision-making by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The analysis is based on a voting model where 1) the chair has agenda-setting powers but must secure the median's approval for her proposal to pass, and 2) the identity of the median changes stochastically over time through voting-right rotation and partisan appointments. The method-of-moments estimation of the model using data from 274 FOMC meetings delivers estimates of the chair and median preference parameters along a dovish-hawkish scale and of their disagreement in each meeting in the sample. Results indicate that disagreement increases the probability of dissents and policy inertia, but that turnover does not increase the volatility of interest rate adjustments.

Keywords: JEL classification: D7 E5 Collective decision-making agenda-setting voting-right rotation polarization monetary policy committee; JEL classification: D7; E5 Collective decision-making; agenda-setting; voting-right rotation; polarization; monetary policy committee (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08-29
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://cnrs.hal.science/hal-05229751v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cnrs.hal.science/hal-05229751v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05229751

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().