Great Power Competition and Power Balance within Strategic Territories
Jean-Pascal Bassino and
Øivind Schøyen
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Jean-Pascal Bassino: CERGIC - Center for Economic Research on Governance, Inequality and Conflict - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon
Øivind Schøyen: UiT - The Arctic University of Norway [Tromsø, Norway]
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Abstract:
As geostrategic competition escalates, the value of controlling territories increases. How does this affect the power balance between state and society within strategic territories? We examine the two Mediterranean islands of Corsica and Sardinia during the conflict between Aragon and Genoa (1351-1444), two late medieval great powers. Increased geostrategic competition had opposite effects on the two islands; it empowered society in Corsica while strengthening feudal institutions in Sardinia. To explain divergence, we develop a novel four-player game between two great powers, local elites, and local society. We show how minor differences in the great powers ability to support the local elites interacted with the change in strategic value to lead to a different development on the two islands. We then consider a repeated version of our game to show how imperfect information can explain why the parties engaged in this costly conflict.
Keywords: Geostrategic Competition; State-Society Balance; Medieval Mediterranean; Game Theory; Institutional Development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-09-19
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