Financial Interactions and Collective States: Part II. Banks, Investors and Firms

Pierre Gosselin () and Aïleen Lotz
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Pierre Gosselin: IF - Institut Fourier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes

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Abstract: In a previous paper, we applied a field formalism to analyze capital allocation and accumulation within a microeconomic framework of investors and firms. The financial connections were modeled by a field of stakes, representing the links between agents. We showed that the resulting collective states were composed of interconnected groups of agents defined by their connections, their returns and disposable capital. However, within this framework, the collective states exhibited structural instability, as capital shortages in specific sectors could trigger cascades of defaults. The present model refines this framework by introducing a third type of agent, banks, a type of investor that can create money through loans. We show that money creation neither eliminates systemic instability nor prevents the emergence of defaults. In fact, the effect of banks on system stability and defaults is ambiguous: When banks favor firms over investors, money creation stabilizes the system by providing the necessary capital to prevent initial defaults, whereas when banks favor investors over firms, investors' influence is strengthened, potentially amplifying instability and defaults. Moreover, regardless of whether they favor investors or firms, banks may facilitate the propagation of defaults once they have started. Ultimately, because banks are themselves investors, the emergence of highly capitalized, high-return banks can directly generate instability in the system. Beyond these mechanisms, the analysis reveals the structural limits of macroprudential regulation. Highly capitalized, high-return investors and banks may appear more diversified and resilient, yet they constitute the primary source of endogenous instability. The model thus highlights that systemic fragility is inherent to the very structure of financial interdependence and capital flows.

Keywords: JEL G10; JEL E1; JEL E00; JEL C60; JEL C02; Interactions. JEL Classification: B40; Multi-Agent Model Interactions. JEL Classification: B40 C02 C60 E00 E1 G10; Collective states; Background fields; Statistical Field Theory; Capital Allocation; Real Economy; Financial Markets; Multi-Agent Model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-11-05
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