Corporate Cartels as a Criminal Network

Florian Thierry-Coudon ()
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Florian Thierry-Coudon: CRED - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit - Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas

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Abstract: Firms may participate in multiple cartels, giving rise to interconnected networks of corporate cartels that share practices, strategies, and information. Using graph theory, we study how the structure of cartel networks affects cartel stability. Firms face a "centrality trade-off": participating in more cartels increases profits but reduces the stability of each cartel. We characterize network structures that enhance cartel stability. Cluster networks, in which no firm is a repeat participant, are the most stable. However, once networks become connected through repeat offenders, greater network density increases cartel stability. In other words, when accounting for networks of corporate cartels, multiple cartels participation may strengthen cartel stability and thereby foster further recidivism.

Keywords: Cartels; Network; Antitrust; Recidivism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10
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